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Calibration and IV Estimation of a Wage Outcome Equation 
in a Dynamic Environment
*
 
We consider an artificial population of forward looking heterogeneous agents making 
decisions between schooling, employment, employment with training and household 
production, according to a behavioral model calibrated to a large set of stylized facts. Some 
of these agents are subject to policy interventions (a higher education subsidy) that vary 
according to their generosity. We evaluate the capacity of Instrumental Variable (IV) methods 
to recover the population Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) and analyze the economic 
implications of using a strong instrument within a dynamic economic model. We also examine 
the performances of two sampling designs that may be used to improve classical linear IV; a 
Regression-Discontinuity (RD) design and an age-based sampling design targeting early 
career wages. Finally, we investigate the capacity of IV to estimate alternative “causal” 
parameters. The failure of classical linear IV is spectacular. IV fails to recover the true LATE, 
even in the static version of the model. In some cases, the estimates lie outside the support 
of the population distribution of returns to schooling and are nearly twice as large as the 
population LATE. The trade-off between the statistical power of the instrument and dynamic 
self-selection caused by the policy shock implies that access to a “strong instrument” is not 
necessarily desirable. There appears to be no obvious realistic sampling design that can 
guarantee IV accuracy. Finally, IV also fails to estimate the reduced-form marginal effect of 
schooling on wages of those affected by the experiment. Within a dynamic setting, IV is 
deprived of any “causal” substance. 
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We evaluate the accuracy of classical linear IV estimation of an outcome equation,
in a context where the endogenous variables originate from a population of highly
heterogeneous agents who solve a (partial equilibrium) multi state dynamic pro 
gramming model. Some of these agents are subject to policy interventions, which
vary according to their intensity. An econometrician, who does not know the data
generating process (aside from the functional form of the outcome equation), and
who has access to data on choices, outcomes and on a policy shock indicator,
estimates the outcome equation by IV. Our task is to evaluate the capacity of
IV to recover the relevant treatment eﬀect parameters. As we focus on outcome
equations that are aﬀected by multiplicative heterogeneity (a random coeﬃcient
speciﬁcation), the corresponding treatment eﬀect parameter is the Local Average
Treatment eﬀect (LATE) introduced in Imbens and Angrist (1994).
In order to link our analysis with the applied microeconometric literature,
we choose a well deﬁned empirical setting. Precisely, we analyze the behavior of
forward looking agents making time allocation decisions between schooling, work,
training and household production over a 33 year period. The key distinction
between work and training is at the level of human capital accumulation; each
state requires full time work but training entails a higher degree of skill accumu 
lation, as well as a higher disutility (a higher psychic cost). The underlying model
is calibrated to a set of well recognized stylized facts (or common conjectures)
about life cycle human capital accumulation and the analysis focuses on point
estimation of the return to schooling.1
We consider two diﬀerent versions of a basic intertemporal model. In the
dynamic version, accumulated skills aﬀect not only wages, but also the utility
(psychic) costs of investing in skill accumulation (given individual heterogene 
1We do so because the return to schooling is the most frequently estimated parameter in
the microeconometrics literature. See Belzil (2007), for a survey.
3ity). In the static version, we remove the dynamic impact of accumulated skills
on future choices, but retain the original heterogeneity structure that causes a
spurious correlation between current and future choices. In words, the static
model is characterized by spurious dynamics.
In our analysis, the policy shock takes the form of a higher education subsidy.
Precisely, we simulate the eﬀects of two diﬀerent levels of the subsidy. By letting
the intensity of the policy vary, we can therefore investigate the relationship be 
tween the accuracy of IV (deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the estimate obtained
from a large sample and the population treatment eﬀect parameter) and the sta 
tistical power of the instrument. As we know the true data generating process,
we simulate a history of sequential decisions for each individual, and dissect the
correlation between the policy shock indicator and the population composite er 
ror term, which also depends on the power of the instrument. We provide an
economic interpretation of the notion of an instrument’s statistical power.
Subsequently, we examine the performances of two diﬀerent sampling designs;
a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design as well as an age based sampling design
which targets early career wages that may be used to perform (and improve) IV.
We discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of each design.
Finally, we investigate the capacity of IV to estimate alternative population
“causal” parameters, such as the reduced form marginal eﬀect of education on
wages for those who have been aﬀected by the policy shock.
It is important to understand that some aspects of the results reported in the
paper are general in nature, while others pertaining to the population of agents
analyzed in the paper, are model speciﬁc. Throughout the paper, we focus on
the general interpretation of the results.
Overall, the failure classical linear IV is quite clear. Because IV confounds
post schooling wage growth with skill acquisition while in school, IV fails to
recover the true LATE, even in the static version of the model. In some cases,
IV estimates lie outside the support of the population distribution of returns to
4schooling, and are almost twice as large as the population LATE. Because of
the trade oﬀ between the statistical power of the instrument and dynamic self 
selection caused by the policy shock, IV performance is practically uncorrelated
with the power of the experiment. Within a dynamic environment, access to a
“strong instrument” is not necessarily desirable.
In an intertemporal setting such as the one analyzed in the paper, a sampling
design can be characterized in two dimensions; namely a cross sectional dimension
(which types of individuals are selected), and a time/age dimension (when are
individuals sampled). We show that IV estimates are not only sensitive to cross 
sectional composition, but are also highly sensitive to the timing of outcome
measurement. In general, it is impossible to dissociate IV from a particular
timing of wage measurement (for a ﬁxed population). Yet, the LATE parameter
is itself invariant to the timing of wage measurement by deﬁnition. There appears
to be no obvious realistic sampling design that can guarantee IV accuracy.
Given that IV fails to estimate the population LATE parameter, it is interest 
ing to investigate what treatment eﬀect IV does estimate. Because IV disregards
post schooling choices, a conjecture is that it may estimate some reduced form
marginal eﬀect of schooling on wages. As empirical labor economists often use
the term “causal” parameter when referring to those parameters that are asso 
ciated to a subset of the population aﬀected by some experiment, it is natural
to compare IV with the marginal eﬀect of education for those who have been
aﬀected by the policy shock. However, our results indicate that IV also fails
to estimate these reduced form marginal eﬀects. Interestingly, IV estimates are
typically much closer to OLS estimates of the eﬀect of education computed on
the control group, or computed on a population that contains both the control
group and the treatment group, than they are to OLS estimates computed on
the sub population of individuals aﬀected by the experiment. Within a dynamic
setting, IV appears to be deprived of any “causal” substance.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present some background
5material as well as a review of the literature. The population behavioral model
is outlined in section 3. We discuss model calibration in Section 4. Section 5 is
devoted to the experimental design. In Section 6, we discuss IV identiﬁcation
within a dynamic model. We discuss the implication of using strong vs weak
instruments in Section 7. In Section 8, we discuss the empirical results that
followed the implementation of classical IV. Section 9 is devoted to the imple 
mentation of alternative sampling designs. In Section 10, we investigate other
potential population parameters that IV may estimate. Section 11 concludes.
2 Background Material and Related Literature
When estimating outcome equations plagued with endogenous variables, micro
econometricians typically choose between two fundamental estimation methods;
Instrumental variables (IV) estimation or structural estimation. The fundamen 
tal paradigm of IV estimation is reliance on a variable (usually a policy shock)
that is assumed to be correlated with an endogenous variable of interest but un 
correlated with the error term of the outcome equation so to obtain independent
variation. In Microeconometrics, this policy shock is sometimes referred to as
a “Natural Experiment” and is usually labeled as an “exogenous variable”. Be 
cause such events are relatively uncommon, empirical studies always rely on a
single experiment, and therefore use only one instrument.
In the ideal context where i) the outcome equation is linear in variables, ii) the
error term of the outcome equation is additive, (iii) the instrument aﬀects indi 
vidual choices in a same (unique) direction and iv) the time elapsed between the
realization of the instrument and the realization of the error term of the outcome
equation precludes any form of intertemporal substitution (i.e. orthogonality
conditions are met), the desirability of IV is well established.2
2See Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and Heckman, Vytlacil and Urzua (2006).
6However, in virtually all micro econometric applications, the parameter of
interest is estimated from data on outcomes measured much after the eﬀect of
the instrument (policy change) has set in. If the true data generating process
i) contains a wide (possibly unknown) number of endogenous variables, or (ii)
is characterized by a high memory law of motion, IV estimates are diﬃcult to
interpret.3
While diﬀerences between structural and IV approaches have been at the fore 
front of microeconometric theory in recent years (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005),
the optimal use of policy instruments, within a dynamic context, has virtually
been evacuated by microeconometricians. Most of the debate between advocates
of IV and structural approaches is about concepts that relate to the treatment
of heterogeneity and, more precisely, the role of monotonicity (or the degree of
separability) in the ﬁrst stage model. However, both approaches are based on a 
priori moment (orthogonality) conditions which are virtually always argued upon
in a more or less static background. Economic analysis of those orthogonality
conditions required to identify the model is practically never performed.4
This paper belongs to a new, but growing, stream of the microeconometrics
literature that aims at providing an econometric interpretation of several IV
estimates reported in the empirical literature. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000)
is the seminal piece in this branch of the literature. They present a survey of
the economic literature using natural experiments (mostly in labor economics
and in development economics) and present an economic analysis of the implicit
assumptions made in the IV literature. Keane (2007) discusses the notion of
identiﬁcation and points out the need for a theoretical model in order to interpret
3See Keane (2007).
4van den Berg (2007) investigates a dynamic model in which it is optimal for the agent to
acquire the value of the intended instrumental variable. This provides a foundation of exclusion
restrictions in terms of economic behavior which can be used to describe the policy evaluation
settings in which instrumental variables are likely or unlikely to make sense.
7IV estimates obtained in a dynamic environment.5
Todd and Wolpin (2006) estimate a dynamic model of schooling and fertility,
using a social experiment that took place in Mexico. Although the authors are
not primarily concerned with the estimation of an outcome equation, they show
that a treatment group may be used to validate a structural model estimated
on a control group. Taken as such, the results reported in Todd and Wolpin
(2006) imply that the instrument may be disregarded by the econometrician at
the inference level, but should be used as a way to provide out of sample ﬁt.
While all of these papers discuss methodology to some extent, none of them
can provide conclusive statements about IV accuracy (or lack thereof). As of
now, it is fair to say that applied micro econometricians (especially in Labor
Economics) prefer the IV approach (Keane, 2007). As empirical Labor Eco 
nomics is largely based one a “one endogenous (choice) variable/one endogenous
state (outcome) variable/one instrument” paradigm, the preference for IV is of 
ten rationalized by the “minimal amount of (parametric) assumptions” required
to apply IV.6
These pessimistic remarks are the point of departure of this research. Pre 
cisely, we start from the principle that in order to evaluate the performance of
IV in a dynamic context, three conditions must be met. First, our analysis re 
quires to know the true underlying data generating process. Second, the data
generating process must be realistic, and therefore must share a large number
5Indeed, Keane (2007) refers to the IV literature as the “Atheoretical approach to Econo-
metrics”. In his comment on Keane (2007), Rust (2007) presents some provocative toughts on
the relative impopularity of the structural approach in micro-econometrics.
6The fascination for static models in microeconometrics (at least in labor economics) has
no pendant in macroeconomics, which has relied on dynamic representations of the economy
for several decades. However, advocates of dynamic general equilibrium models of the business
cycle have recently questioned the validity of Structural Vector Autoregressive Regressions
(SVAR) models as an alternative to structural modeling. See Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2007).
8of characteristics with observational data used in the applied literature. For in 
stance, virtually all parameters should be individual speciﬁc, and the time horizon
should be long enough to allow us to generate cross section data representing a
relatively wide (and realistic) age dispersion.7 Finally, to reproduce the condi 
tions that are usually faced by applied econometricians, IV estimates should be
relatively imprecise.
For these reasons, the ﬁrst step of the analysis (the choice of the population
parameters used to generate artiﬁcial data) can hardly be achieved realistically
by estimation. Instead, we rely on informal calibration.8 The details are found
in subsequent sections. The behavioral model is presented and discussed in the
next section.
3 The Behavioral Model
Before setting up the model, we discuss some requirements that must be imposed
on the theoretical structure.
First, we disregard modeling a labor market with multiple sectors. We do
so because the empirical IV literature is based on the availability of a single
instrument (one natural experiment). Even in absence of any post schooling
endogenous variables, the econometrician using IV would not be able to estimate
7In a companion paper, we compare estimates of an outcome equation obtained from a
standard linear IV model with those obtained from a benchmark structural dynamic model
of choices and outcomes (a dynamic multinomial logit model of choices, with normal wages),
estimated by simulated maximum likelihood. The structure resembles the popular empirical
IO model of Berry, Levinhson and Pakes (1994).
8Treating a model structure as a known DGP and performing IV out of simulated data is
not new. This is done, among others, in Imai and Keane (2004), within an intertremporal
labor supply model, and in Belzil and Hansen (2005), within a dynamic model of schooling
attainments.
9a sector/occupation speciﬁc return to schooling.9
Second, the model should rule out general equilibrium eﬀects. If not, the
wage distribution would not be invariant to policy change, and the monotonicity
property (the requirement that individuals react in a same direction) may be lost.
IV would then fail by construction.10
Our desire is to generate population moments that may characterize obser 
vational data on schooling, work, training, household production and earnings.11
To do this, we select a certain number of population characteristics which are
usually regarded as stylized facts.
In total, we selected the following 8 attributes:
1. Schooling activities must be located mostly at the beginning of the time
horizon. Individuals should rarely return to school, after having worked in
the market.
2. Schooling should account, on average, for approximately one sixth of the
total time horizon.
3. The incidence of the intensive human capital accumulation state (work and
training) must be declining with age.
4. OLS regressions of simulated wages on accumulated experience (potential)
should disclose a declining return (a concave wage proﬁle).
5. Labor Market employment (either the sum of full time work and work with
training) must be the most common choice over the life cycle
6. Household production must be a relatively rare event
9See Keane and Wolpin, 1997.
10This issue is discussed in Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998). They investigate tuition
policies within a calibrated lifecycle general equilibrium model of human capital formation.
11For instance, the artiﬁcal panel data that we generate could resemble the NLSY (one of
the most popular data sets used in the structural literature on human capital).
107. OLS regressions of simulated wages on education should produce a higher
return than the average in the population.
8. The average return to schooling of those aﬀected by the education subsidy
should exceed the population average.
The ﬁrst characteristic is a universally accepted fact. The second charac 
teristic would apply to most advanced countries (such as the US, Canada and
Europe). The third characteristic is also observed in most countries, and arises
in any ﬁnite horizon model. The fourth characteristic is an indirect implication
of the declining incidence of productive investment.
The ﬁfth and sixth are particularly relevant for a population of males.
The seventh and eighth characteristics may be somewhat more controversial.
The seventh one is sometimes referred to as the classical “ability bias” hypothesis.
It implies that the correlation between wages and schooling is an over estimate
of the true eﬀect of schooling on productivity. We choose a positive (as opposed
to a negative) bias because of its intuitive aspect. It would obviously be possible
to deﬁne the model structure diﬀerently, or to modify the dynamic structure, so
to imply a negative OLS bias. This would have no implication for our analysis.
Finally, the eight one may also be controversial because it is far from a stylized
fact. Indeed, it is a pure conjecture. However, it is the most common interpreta 
tion that empirical labor economists oﬀer for the incidence of high IV estimates
of the return to schooling, which are usually reported in the literature. For this
reason, we build our model under this speciﬁc assumption.12
12There may be other features of life cycle wages that may be occasionnally cited, but as
pointed out recently in Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2006) and Belzil (2008, forthcoming),
many widely accepted features of the standard Mincer wage equations are rejected when tested
formally.
113.1 Model Structure
The baseline model is a stochastic dynamic discrete choice model of labor sup 
ply/human capital accumulation over the life cycle. There are 33 periods to
allocate between the 4 mutually exclusive states. The states are Schooling (s),
work with a low rate of skill accumulation (e), work with a high rate of skill accu 
mulation (a), and Household Production (h). The corresponding capital letters
(St,Et,At,Ht) are used to measure the number of periods accumulated in each
state. There is a maximum of 11 years of schooling attainable. In observational
data, the pendant of state e could be full time employment, while the pendant
of state (a) could be work, with on the job training. The distinction between
Full time employment (e) and Work and Training (a) is therefore in the intensity
of human capital accumulation (a is the high intensity mode). We assume that
the utility of school changes with grade level and we consider 3 distinct levels; 1
to 4, 5 to 8, and 9 to 11.13
Individuals are risk neutral and maximize the expected value of lifetime net
earnings, over the entire life cycle. The state speciﬁc utilities are deﬁned below.
3.2 School









1   I(St ≥ 5)) − α
s
2   I(9 ≤ St)) − α
s
3   (t − St) + ε
S
it (1)
where I(.) is the indicator function. The parameters αs
1,and αs
2 capture the higher
direct costs of schooling faced by those who enrol in college. These parameters
reﬂect tuition costs and the like. The parameter αS
3 captures the psychic cost of
attending school for those who would have interrupted their education (the length
13We interpret the second level (5 to 8) as the pendant of college education.
12of interruption is t − S(t)). The term αS
i represents individual heterogeneity in
taste for schooling (academic ability). Finally, εS
it is a stochastic i.i.d. shock.
3.3 Household Production
The utility of household production, Uh









i is individual speciﬁc utility of household activities and εh
it is a stochastic
i.i.d. shock.
3.4 Employment and Training
The utility of work without training, UE
it , and the utility of work with training,
UA
it, are constructed as the diﬀerence between the wage rate and the monetary
costs of occupying a speciﬁc state. Precisely, UE
it and UA
it, and their related costs,
Ce
it() and Ca
it(), are given by the following equations;
U
j
it = Wit − C
j





0i + c1j   Sit + c2j   Hit + c3j   Eit + c4j   Ait + ε
j
it for j = e,a (4)
where c1j,c2j,c3j and c4j are parameters capturing the eﬀect of accumulated
schooling, home time, employment and training on the cost (or disutility) of
work, or work and training. They illustrate the dynamics of skill accumulation
(skills beget skills). The ε
j′
its are a i.i.d. stochastic shocks.
3.5 Market Productivity
The reward to human capital investment is embedded in the following wage equa 
tion
13logWit = wit = α
w + λi   Sit + δi   Eit + θi   Ait + ε
w
it (5)
where Wit is the wage rate per unit of time, αw is the intercept term, and λi,θi,δi
are individual speciﬁc returns to schooling, work, and work and training.14 Alto 
gether the vector {βi,δi,θi} summarizes individual labor market skills. εw
it is the
stochastic i.i.d. term aﬀecting earnings.
3.6 The Bellman Equations
The choices are summarized in the binary indicators, dtk. Precisely, dtk = 1 when
option k (w,h,w,a) is chosen. Given the Markovian structure of the model, the
solution to the problem is obtained using recursive methods, and optimal choices
may be characterized by a Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957).





t ( t) = U
k




t+1( t+1) | dkt = 1} (6)
or, more compactly, as
V
k
t ( t) = U
k
t + βEVt+1( t+1 | dkt = 1) (7)
where β is the discount factor, and where  t is the set containing all state vari 
ables known by the agent at t. The law of motion maps current choices (dkt) and
current state variables ( t) onto future state variables ( t+1).
14Although it would also be possible to allow the intercept term to be individual speciﬁc, the
rich multiplicative heterogeneity structure makes it redundant.
143.7 The Distribution of Individual Heterogeneity and Ran-
dom Shocks












0k,βk;pk} for k = 1,2,..20 (8)






it} is a vector of i.i.d. mutually independent random shocks.
Each random shock follows a Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
σ(j) for j = s,h,e,a,w.
3.8 Model Solution
As is relatively common in the literature, we solve the Bellman equations using
simulated realizations of the random shocks. The Bellman equations need to be
solved for each single type separately. Our solution method is exact in the sense
that we do not use any approximation or interpolation methods. More details
are found in Section 4 and Section 8.
4 Calibration of the Model
Because it would be tedious to describe all parameters separately, we present the
general philosophy that underlies our choices. A set of parameters describing the
heterogeneity components is found in appendix (Table A1). The correlations are
found in Table A2.
15The heterogeneity structure is suﬃciently rich that we do not even need to introduce an
individual speciﬁc (or type speciﬁc) psychic cost of choosing employment (ce
0).
15As a starting point, we choose hourly wages as the benchmark utility. To
choose the preference parameters, we relied mostly on the structural literature,
in order to obtain a realistic range of the relevant parameters (when possible).
Then, we simulated the model and adjusted the parameters until the ﬁnal values
enabled us to match the population characteristics or the population moments
that we stated as desirable.16
4.1 Outcome Equation and skills
The distribution of returns to schooling is centered at 0.06 (a value close to
estimates reported in the structural literature). However, we allow for a high
degree of dispersion (as reported in the IV/LATE literature). The support of
the distribution of returns ranges between 0.00 and 0.12 (see Table A1). These
numbers therefore reﬂect estimates reported in both the structural and the IV
literature.17
The average returns to work experience (0.01) and to work with training
(0.03) are chosen to reﬂect the fact that human capital accumulation is more
intensive in state a than in state e. We treat the utility of school, the cost of
on the job training and the return to education as driven by an academic skill,
and enforce a perfect correlation between these components. However, to deviate
from a trivial ability bias structure, we assume that both the wage intercept and
the return to work experience may be driven by skills that may be non academic,
and enforce a weak correlation between these two components, and the other
academic heterogeneity components (the utility of school, the cost of on the job
16We did not proceed with a formal calibration procedure, in which a set of precise moment
conditions are imposed, because the population characteristics that we target are more quali-
tative than quantitative. For instance, the positive ability bias and the concavity of the wage
proﬁle would need to be represented as inequality conditions.
17A detailed comparison between structural and IV approach is found in Belzil (2007).
16training and the return to education).18
4.2 Post Schooling Dynamics
The parameters {c1a,c2a,c3a,c4a} and {c1e,c2e,c3e,c4e} are capturing the eﬀect
of accumulated schooling, home time, employment and training on the cost (or
disutility) of work/training (a) and work (e). The vectors are equal to { 0.30,
0.00, 0.00,  0.05) for state a, and { 0.20, 0.00,  0.05,  0.05) for state e. The
parameter values for c1a ( 0.30) and c1e ( 0.20) imply that accumulated schooling
reduces both the cost of investing in human capital and the cost of labor market
work. The larger eﬀect of education on the cost of training is a reﬂection of the
academic nature of the work/training activity. The non negative values for c3e
and c4e allow us to introduce some dynamics in the decision to work. The null
values for c2a and c2e imply the absence of skill depreciation.
4.3 Preference Heterogeneity and Discount Rates
To reﬂect preference heterogeneity, we allow discount rates to diﬀer across indi 
viduals. They range between 0.00 and 0.10. The average discount rate (0.05)
is standard. This form of preference heterogeneity may also be re interpreted as
a way to approximate the eﬀects of liquidity constraints. It is important to do
so, because in the IV literature, the high IV estimates are often conjectured to
arise because they reﬂect the LATE parameters of a subpopulation of individ 
uals aﬀected by liquidity constraints, or of a subpopulation of individuals who
have high discount rates. As economics oﬀers no guidance for the choice of a
correlation between discount rates and individual skills, we started the calibra 
tion procedure by imposing quasi orthogonality between discount factors and
18In the single skill model of Belzil and Hansen (2002), the correlation is above 0.9. In a
multiple skill model (such as in Keane and Wolpin, 1997), the correlation between the utility
of attending school and white collar skills would also be very high.
17other heterogeneity components, and adjusted the correlations in order to match
population characteristics. In other words, and as opposed to the correlations be 
tween various market skills and the costs of training and schooling, we regarded
the correlations between discount rates and other heterogeneity components as
secondary. Indeed, they do not play a key role in our analysis.
4.4 Heterogeneity vs Ex Ante risk
In order to calibrate the model, we must implicitly choose the relative importance
of heterogeneity (cross sectional dispersion in skills) vs. ex ante risk (the variance
of the random shocks aﬀecting the outcome equation). This is diﬃcult. The
structural literature on dynamic discrete choices always assumes that individual
eﬀects are known, and that random shocks are not. While the issue has only
started recently to raise interest, it is too early to establish a consensus. For
this reason, we relied on estimates reported in Belzil and Hansen (2007), who
estimated a correlated random coeﬃcient wage regression, and set the standard
deviations of all random shocks to 0.5.
4.5 The Control Groups
In order to proceed further, we build one control group for the dynamic model,
and one for the static model. The dynamic version of the model is identiﬁed by
the parameter values that were discussed in 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 , and reported
in Appendix (Table A1). In the dynamic model, the correlation between current
and future choices is driven by persistent unobserved heterogeneity, as well as a
causal eﬀect of current choices on the cost of choosing future actions. The static
model is a restricted version of the dynamic model. It is obtained by setting
the c1j,c2j,c3j and c4j to 0 for j = a and e. In the static model, the correlation
between current and future choices is explained solely by persistent individual
heterogeneity. In other words, there is spurious dynamics.
18In order to construct population data for the control group, each type of
individuals is duplicated in 250 diﬀerent realizations of the random vector (for
a total of 5,000 units). For each model, we simulate 33 years of data on wage
outcomes and choices for a total 5000 individuals.
We provide a summary of individual choices for each model in Table 1A
(Dynamic model) and Table 1B (Static model). To do so, we compute the number
of accumulated periods in each state for each model . The frequencies display
the desired features that we advocated in Section 4. For instance, schooling is
chosen mostly in the ﬁrst 10 years. Average schooling attainments are higher in
the dynamic version (5 years) of the model than in the static one (3.8 years).
Home production is rarely chosen (it accounts for approximately 10% of total
time allocation in the dynamic model). However, it is interesting to note that
the incidence of inactivity increases in the static version of the model. The
average number of periods spent at home, equal to 4.4 in the dynamic model,
increases to 8.7 in the static version. This is explained by the larger opportunity
cost of being involved in non productive states, which characterizes the dynamic
model. Finally, the incidence of work and training is found to decrease as one
approaches the end of the life cycle, and therefore illustrates a decreasing rate of
skill accumulation.
Although the decreasing incidence of training is established in Table 1A and
Table 1B, we also performed OLS regressions of log wages on education, and
potential experience, in order to double check concavity. As the procedure used
to simulate data is a central element of our analysis, it will be presented in details
in Section 8. For the moment, it is suﬃcient to point out that regressions are
computed on a cross section of 5,000 observations. In other words, we used a
single wage per individual. We do this simply because most empirical studies
reporting OLS or IV use cross section data, even when panel data are available.
To do so, we select a period between period 5 and period 33 using a random
number generator. In Table 2A, we present summary statistics that characterize
19the wage distribution in the control group for both the dynamic and static models.
The results of these OLS regressions are reported in Table 2B. OLS estimates are
in the neighborhood of 0.12, which is comparable to OLS estimates obtained from
various cross sections of the NLSY (in the US) and are therefore higher than the
population average return. The average growth rate is between 1% and 1.5% per
year of potential market experience (an estimate also close to numbers found for
the US).19
5 Characterizing the Experiment
The higher education subsidy experiment consists of giving a transfer payment
to those attending grade levels 5,6,7 and 8. This boils down to a reduction in the
monetary costs of attending those speciﬁc grade levels.
5.1 The Statistical Power of the Experiment
The recent literature on IV estimation has pointed out statistical issues that
pertain to the use of instruments that are weakly correlated with the endogenous
variable of interest.20 To introduce the statistical power of the experiment in
our analysis, we simulate the eﬀects of various levels of education subsidies. We
impose a reduction of the cost parameter (αS
1) of the order 1 dollar (low level),
and 3 dollars (high level). These numbers generate F statistics that vary between
3 (low intensity static model) and 58 (high intensity dynamic model).21 The
related standard errors will be discussed later.
19Although we did not want to impose any speciﬁc relationship between education and age-
earnings proﬁles, we noted that our model implies a positive eﬀect for the interaction between
education and experience. This would be the case, for instance, with data taken from the
NLSY.
20See Staiger and Stock (1995).
21For instance, a ﬁrst stage regression F statistic around 10 is sometimes viewed as ideal by
practionners.
20At the outset, it should be clear that choosing a subsidy that is realized at
a grade level (level 5), which is around the average schooling attainment for the
control group, puts IV in almost ideal conditions. For instance, if we implemented
policy interventions that are realized either in the neighborhood of the minimum
or the maximum schooling attainment (say a mandatory schooling attainment,
or a subsidy conditional on attending grade level 9,10 and 11), IV would suﬀer a
larger risk of lying outside the support of the returns to schooling distribution.
This is simply because the average return of those aﬀected by some “extremist”
policy, would also be more likely to lie in the neighborhood of the extreme values
of the support of the distribution.
In Table 3, we summarize the main eﬀects of the policy interventions. At this
stage, it is important to understand that these quantities are meant to summa 
rize the counterfactual eﬀects of implementing a new policy. For this reason, they
are computed using the same realizations of the random shock vector that were
used to generate the control group. In other words, we evaluate the counterfac 
tual eﬀects of the new policy by computing individual decisions of the control
group under the old regime, as well as under the new regime, while holding indi 
vidual random shock histories constant. This guarantees that the Monotonicity
condition will hold.
In order to illustrate the implications of moving from a lower to a higher
subsidy, we report a F statistic computed from a regression of schooling on the
instrument, as well as the density of the sub population (the population propor 
tion) aﬀected by the experiment.
In the dynamic model, the experiment increases average years of schooling
by 0.25 in the low subsidy regime, and 0.5 year in the high subsidy regime. As
a consequence, the density of the population aﬀected, as well as the F statistic,
both increase as we move toward a more generous policy. The F statistics of the
dynamic model are equal to 12.3 (low intensity) and 57.9 (high intensity). The
fraction of the population aﬀected by the experiment goes from 0.18 to 0.32.
21Overall, the experiment is weaker in a static environment, as the F statistics
range between 3.3 and 45.4. This is easily explained. In absence of a causal eﬀect
of education on the costs of acquiring future skills, the incentive to get more
educated is smaller. For this reason, the changes in schooling (0.13 and 0.50) and
the proportions of individuals aﬀected (0.09 and 0.26) are smaller.
5.2 The Population Local Average Treatment Eﬀects
We now turn to the population Local Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE). We use
the standard deﬁnition of the LATE parameter and evaluate it as the average
return to schooling for those who are aﬀected by the experiment (those for whom
post experiment schooling is not equal to pre experiment schooling).22 In our
analysis, an individual is deﬁned as a type and a particular random shocks history.
Because of its intrinsic counterfactual nature, computing the LATE requires to
hold the vector of realized random shocks constant for each individual.23
Within a dynamic setting, the LATE associated to a speciﬁc policy change
depends on the type of intervention, on its intensity, and on the underlying model.
First, the subsidy aﬀects the behavior of those who would obtain a lower level
of schooling ex ante through the future component of the utility of attending
school.
At the same time, the subsidy increases the continuation probabilities of those
who would have reached higher education even in absence of the subsidy. That is,
for a given random shock, a higher subsidy increases the probability of continuing
22Imbens and Angrist, 1994, introduced the notion of LATE in an IV context. Bj¨ orklund and
Moﬃtt (1987) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) introduced the notion of marginal treatment
eﬀect, which generalizes the LATE parameter. Finally, Belzil and Hansen (2007) estimate
LATE parameters within a stochastic dynamic programming model.
23Because the LATE parameters are computed from 5,000 realizations of the vector of random
shocks, their sampling variability turn out to be very small. As a consequence, we treat it as a
population parameters.
22further for those already attending higher education.
Finally, in a multi variate heterogeneity framework, individual choices (and
therefore individual reaction to policy changes) are a non trivial function of all
individual endowments (such as discount rates, skills and tastes). For all these
reasons, the eﬀect of a change in policy intensity (say a movement from a low
intensity to a high intensity policy) is diﬃcult to predict. It will depend on the
diﬀerence between the two diﬀerent sets of individuals aﬀected by the policy.
For each subsidy intervention, we have computed the Local Average Treat 
ment Eﬀects (LATE). These are also summarized in Table 3.
As is evident from the numbers provided in Table 3, the LATE parameter
does practically not vary with the intensity of the experiment, despite the relative
diﬀerences in the population density of individuals aﬀected. This is true both in
the dynamic model (0.0710 and 0.0714) and the static model (0.0789 and 0.0781).
As we will see later, this is an important feature of the model that we have
calibrated. It indicates that, in our speciﬁc model, individual returns to school 
ing are not the only determinant of individual reactions to policy change. In
particular, individual comparative advantages in labor market work, in training,
as well as diﬀerences in discount rates may also be relevant.
6 IV Identifying Conditions in a Dynamic En-
vironment
In order to comprehend what IV is in a dynamic setting, it is useful to re express
the Mincer equation as follows:
wit = λi   (
t ￿
j=1





ϕit(.) = δi   (
t ￿
j=1




The econometrician who estimates the wage equation using a natural experiment
uses a policy shock indicator, denoted Zi, as a source of identifying condition. As
IV, which is deﬁned as (Z′S)−1Z′w, naturally arises in a classical linear regression
framework with an additive error term, it is informative to consider the economic
implications of the IV identifying conditions in a dynamic environment.
To achieve identiﬁcation, the econometrician must disregard all post schooling
choices and collapse them in a composite error term.
Using a cross sectional notation, one starts from
wi = λ0 +   λ   Si + ε
∗
it (10)
where λ0 is an intercept term,   λ is the population average, and where ε∗
it (the
composite error term) is equal to
ε
∗




ωκi = λi −   λ
The error term ε∗
it is composed of three distinct elements.
First, εW
it is a purely stochastic innovation. It plays no role in our analysis.
Second, the term (ωκi   Si) is the classical representation of the error term in
a correlated random coeﬃcient wage regression model.24
Finally, the term ϕ(.) collapses the eﬀects of all post schooling choices made
until date t.25 It depends on the actual sequence of individual choices, on the het 
erogeneity distribution, and indirectly, on both schooling and the policy shock
24This term is the central piece in the analysis of Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Heckman
and Vytlacil (2005).
25The model allows individuals to leave school for work, and to return to school subsequently.
24indicator (Z). Obviously, it also depends on age (or calendar time). As a con 
sequence, the correlation between ϕit(.) and the policy shock also changes as
individuals evolve over time, and so does the correlation between ε∗
it and the pol 
icy shock . So, from now on, it will be convenient to think about the composite
error term as ε∗
it(Z).
7 What does a Strong Instrument Mean in a
Dynamic Model?
In the weak instrument literature, a high correlation between the instrument and
the endogenous variable is viewed as desirable for two main reasons. First, a
strong instrument increases the precision of IV.
A second reason has to do with the asymptotic bias. In a model with additive





That is, for a given (ﬁxed) level of correlation between the instrument and the
error term, a strong instrument reduces the IV bias. Obviously, when the error
term is viewed as an individual (ﬁxed) heterogeneity endowment, it is possible to
think about variations in the strength of an instrument (variations in the intensity
of the policy shock), for a ﬁxed level of correlation between the instrument and the
error term. However, this argument is inherently static. We now pay attention
to the desirability of a strong instrument, within a dynamic setting.
As most applied econometricians interpret IV in a framework where hetero 
geneity is multiplicative (and correlated with the regressor), the degree of in 
accuracy should measure the distance between IV and its estimand (the Local
Average Treatment Eﬀect). So, from now on, in order to avoid confusion, we re 
serve the term “inaccuracy” for the IV LATE diﬀerence (ˆ λiV −λL), while the term
“asymptotic bias” is reserved for the IV population average diﬀerence (λIV −   λ).
In a dynamic setting, the weak/strong instrument distinction becomes more
25complicated. To see the argument, it is suﬃcient to recognize the dependence of
both S(.) and ε∗(.) on Z .
Re write the IV LATE diﬀerence as








Within a class of policy experiment (for instance, a policy that implements a
higher education subsidy), a variation in the intensity of the incentive has several
implications.
First, an increase in intensity changes the correlation between schooling and
the policy shock (the ﬁrst stage regression). At the same time, this change in
intensity may induce a change in the population local average treatment eﬀect,
λL(Z).
Second, and independently from the potential change in the LATE, an in 
crease in policy intensity also changes the correlation between the instrument
and the error term, since individual post schooling choices are also aﬀected by
the variation in intensity.
Third, even in the sole presence of persistent heterogeneity in the utility of
post schooling choices (in the static version of the model with spurious dynamics),
a change in the intensity of Z will automatically change the correlation between
Z and the error term. This is because the change in schooling observed for a
subset of the population will translate into a change in the correlation between
Z and ϕit(.), which is explained by the fact that these individuals have diﬀerent
endowments (returns to schooling, returns to training and returns to work expe 
rience). It is important to understand that this may happen even if diﬀerences
in individual returns to schooling between those aﬀected and those who are not,
are very small.
As a consequence, having access to a strong instrument may not always be a
blessing. There is no guarantee that increasing the power of the instrument will
26increase IV accuracy.
For example, consider an hypothetical case where a movement from Zlow to
Zhigh denotes an increase in intensity, and assume, without loss of generality,
that IV over estimates the LATE in both cases. An increase in IV accuracy (i.e.





















< λL(Zhigh) − λL(Zlow) (13)
In words, an increase in accuracy associated to a stronger instrument, will
always require some adjustment condition governing the co movements between
the true LATE parameters, the ﬁrst stage regression, and the correlations between
the instrument and the population error term.
As an illustration, suppose an example where (i) λL(Zhigh)−λL(Zlow) is close
to 0 (which is actually the case in our model), and where (ii) the correlation be 
tween the error term and the instrument is positive under both the high intensity
and the low intensity regime, the implementation of the high intensity policy must
imply either a decrease in the instrument error term correlation, or an increase






















Obviously, these inequalities would have to be adjusted for cases where IV
under estimates its target, or for cases where increasing policy intensity would
reduce the correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable of
interest. However, the main conclusions would remain the same. Access to a
27stronger instrument would only increase IV accuracy under some speciﬁc condi 
tions.
As is going to be illustrated below in the context of our dynamic skill accu 
mulation model, those speciﬁc conditions are not imposed by IV estimation. As
noted earlier, IV has been developed in a classical linear regression framework
with an additive error term. The moment conditions that deﬁne IV are those
that characterize the orthogonality of the policy shock with respect to the econo 
metrician’s error term. This implies that, for a given model structure, and given
a precise target (the LATE parameter), there may exist an optimal degree of
policy intensity associated to a speciﬁc class of policy intervention.26
We can now proceed with a formal implementation of diﬀerent IV strategies
on our calibrated model.
8 Computing Classical IV
We now turn to the implementation of classical IV estimates.
8.1 Creating a Cross-Sectional Data Set
To mimic empirical analyses reported in the IV literature, we must achieve two
things. First, we must append a treatment group to the control group which
has already been deﬁned. However, as it is the case in observational data, the
treatment and control groups should be representative of the same population
(display the same distribution of types) but should still be composed of diﬀerent
individuals. Second, we must construct a sub population of individuals who work
26This point is obviously diﬀerent from the notion of optimal instruments that relates to
eﬃciency arguments. For instance, in the example analyzed in this paper, there may be an
optimal amount of higher education subsidy that would lead to the most accurate IV estimate
of the LATE parameter (minimum bias). However, the theoretical existence of such an optimal
instrument strength is a conjecture which we do not investigate any further.
28(at least once) in the labor force.
In order to build the treatment group, we proceed as we did for the control
group. Again, each type of individuals is duplicated in 250 diﬀerent realizations
of the random vector (for a total of 5,000 units). We simulate 33 years of choices
and wage outcomes under the new policy, as described in the previous section. As
we did for OLS regressions of wage outcomes on the control group, we select one
wage per individual over the entire life cycle. More precisely, individual wages
are selected randomly between period 5 and period 33, because most actual cross 
section data sets contain wages that are realized over the entire life cycle, but do
not include very young workers.27 To do so, we use a uniform random number
generator. We end up with 10000 observations (5000 in control and 5000 in
treatment).
In the second step, we use simulated choices, and construct a sub population
of individuals who are either in state e or state a at the actual period randomly
selected. These conditions must be met when IV is actually implemented on
observational cross section data.
It is important to understand that sampling the Labor Force entails two dif 
ferent types of selection; namely a classical cross sectional dimension (what type
of individuals do we sample) and a time dimension (when are individual wages
measured).28
Before going any further, two issues have to be clariﬁed. First, and because
applying IV to diﬀerent sub populations (diﬀerent sampling regimes) may imply
changing the true LATE parameter, a logical estimation strategy requires to select
the particular LATE in which the econometrician is interested. For the sake of
the presentation, we will ﬁrst assume that the econometrician is interested in the
27In our model, period 5 would be naturally compared to the period at which individuals
decide to enter higher education (say, around 18 years of age).
28An entry wage is deﬁned as a wage oﬀer for an individual who has, until that time, accu-
mulated no work experience and no on-the-job training.
29population LATE (the control group). Indeed, in the current model, it turns out
that the LATE parameter is relatively inelastic with respect to cross sectional
sampling. This facilitates the task of the econometrician.29 This very small
elasticity of the LATE parameter is a feature of any life cycle model of human
capital accumulation in which forward looking agents take into account that the
largest share of the life cycle is spent in the labor market. In other words, rational
individuals may take their decisions primarily on their post schooling comparative
advantages.
Second, because IV estimates are theoretically inconsistent, their sampling
variability cannot be evaluated by the usual formulas. Instead, we evaluate it
using bootstrap methods.
8.2 IV Estimates Obtained from the Labor Force
For the sake of realism, we ﬁrst focus on IV estimates which have been ob 
tained using the population of labor force participants. The results are in Table
4. Apart from IV estimates and their standard error, we report OLS estimates
of the eﬀect of education on wages (log), as well as the diﬀerence between IV
and both the population LATE parameter and the population average (namely
ˆ λiV −λL, and ˆ λiV −  λ). We also report several correlations between the instrument
and various components of the composite error term. These include the corre 
lation between the instrument and (i) the composite error term (Corr(Zi, ε∗
it)),
(ii) post schooling choices (Corr(Zi, ϕit(.)), and (iii) the product of schooling
times individual returns (Corr(Zi,ωλi   Si)). Finally, we also report the correla 
tion between the instrument and schooling, as well as the ﬁrst stage regression F
Statistic.
29Obviously, it would be possible to construct another model in which the LATE would be
more sensitive to sampling. The econometrician would then need to decide which LATE raises
more interest. As far as we know, this issue (rather fundamental in our opinion) is practically
never discussed in empirical IV papers using a LATE interpretation.
308.2.1 The Dynamic Model
As a starting point, we examine the implementation of the low intensity experi 
ment within the dynamic model. The reduction in the total number of observa 
tions (ranging between 7000 and 8000 individuals according to policy intensity)
obviously reﬂects that the labor force is only a subset of the general population.
The IV estimate is equal to 0.10. As indicated earlier, the population LATE (as
well as the Labor Force LATE) is virtually three percentage points lower (0.07).30
IV is not only inaccurate, but is also very imprecise (with an estimated standard
error (0.0374). This high degree of inaccuracy prevails while the correlation be 
tween the instrument and schooling (equals to 0.05) implies a reasonably high
ﬁrst stage F statistic (17.9). Interestingly, and as is the case in many empirical
applications, the OLS estimate computed from the labor Force population (equal
to 0.09) is inferior to the IV estimate.
We now focus on the potential reduction of this inaccuracy. According to the
weak instrument literature, increasing the strength of the instrument is desirable.
We now examine the inaccuracy that would result from the implementation of the
high subsidy policy. After all, the F Statistic (which is equal to 63.9) obtained
with the high subsidy is three times as large as with the low subsidy. As noted
before (equation 15), and because both in the low level intensity and in the high
level intensity cases, IV over estimates the LATE, a reduction in asymptotic bias
requires that the change in the population LATE induced by the instrument
(λL(Zhigh) − λL(Zlow)) must be larger than the diﬀerence in asymptotic biases
(As.Biashigh − As.Biaslow).31 However, this is not the case. The IV obtained
30If the LATE parameters had been computed from the labor force population, the low and
high intensity values would be equal to 0.0708 and 0.0713 respectively. This illustrates well
the very low elasticity of the LATE parameter with respect to policy intensity (in the current
model).
31As noted earlier, inequalities have to be adjusted according to whether IV over-estimates
or under-estimates its target.
31with the high subsidy is equal 0.1026. Despite an increase in precision (the
standard error is around 0.019), IV is even more inaccurate, since the diﬀerence
in asymptotic biases is strictly positive while the diﬀerence between the high and
low intensity LATE is virtually equal to 0 (0.0004). So, an increase in statistical
power of the experiment has translated into a reduction in accuracy.
There are two issues that need to be explained. The ﬁrst one is the failure of
IV. The second one is the fragility of the weak/strong instrument paradigm.
To understand the failure of IV, it is important examine the composition of
the error term. Once a new policy sets in, a subset of the population reacts
by increasing schooling. Given this increase, two mechanisms are playing at the
same time.
First, an increase in schooling (caused by the policy shock) raises the attrac 
tiveness of employment and training, at the detriment of household production.
This automatically changes Corr(Zi, ϕit(.)). This ﬁrst mechanism reﬂects the
causal eﬀect of schooling on subsequent skill accumulation, after conditioning on
individual heterogeneity.
However, as individual who react are also endowed with diﬀerent returns to
experience and training, this also translates into a correlation between the policy
shock indicator and the error term. This is the second mechanism. It is a pure
composition eﬀect. It is present even if schooling does not cause future skill
accumulation, after controlling for individual heterogeneity.
Given this, the fragility of the relationship between IV accuracy and instru 
ment’s power, may easily be explained. As noted earlier, within a dynamic set 
ting, a change in policy intensity not only changes the correlation between the
instrument and education choices, but also changes the correlation between the
instrument and the error term. In this speciﬁc example (the dynamic model
applied to the labor force), an increase in the correlation between Z and post 
schooling choices from 0.0074 to 0.0099 (as seen in Table 4), is suﬃcient to raise
the correlation between Z and the error term from 0.012 to 0.024. This reduces
32IV accuracy. This is all happening despite a huge increase in the signiﬁcance of
the ﬁrst stage regression.
8.2.2 The Static Model
We now consider the static version of the model. The IV estimate resulting from
the low subsidy experiment is equal to 0.0292. This is far below the population
LATE, which is equal to 0.0789 with the low intensity policy. However, IV is also
particularly imprecise (as indicated by its standard error equal to 0.026). With
the higher intensity policy, the IV estimate increases to 0.0858, to reach a value
that exceeds the LATE, which is equal to 0.0781 with the low intensity policy.32
Compared to what was observed for the dynamic model, or for the low intensity
version of the static model, this may appear as a reasonable performance since
the diﬀerence between ˆ λiV and λL is 0.0077.
This very high sensitivity of IV is again well illustrated by the correlations
between Z and various components of the error term. Both the correlation be 
tween the instrument and the product of schooling times individual deviations
from the population returns (Corr(Zi,ωλi   Si), and the correlation between the
instrument and post schooling choices (Corr(Zi, ϕit(.))) are strongly aﬀected by
the change in intensity. They go respectively from 0.0010 to 0.0236, and from
 0.0062 to 0.0050. As a result, increasing the power of the instrument is beneﬁcial
to IV accuracy in the static version of the model, even though it is detrimental in
the dynamic version. In other words, the capacity to increase IV accuracy with
a stronger instrument is model dependent. This illustrates the fragility of the
weak strong instrument paradigm, within a dynamic context.
32For the static version of the model, the LATE parameters computed from the labor force
population (equal 0.0780 for the low intensity case, and to 0.0781 for the high intensity case)
are practically equivalent to those computed for the general population.
338.3 Some Preliminary Conclusions
At this stage, the performance of IV appears very bad. Except for the static
version of the model with high policy intensity, IV seems incapable of estimating
the population LATE parameter. Before considering alternative sampling de 
signs, the following remarks should be noted. A natural guess is to impute the
failure of IV to classical composition (selection) eﬀects. In theory, low produc 
tivity individuals are less likely to be observed in the sub population analyzed by
applied econometricians (other things equal). In our model, individual attrac 
tion toward work is explained by returns to work experience (including training),
individual returns to schooling and even discount rates. In Table 7, we report
the average endowments of all sub populations analyzed in the paper, along with
the population average. Indeed, these numbers indicate that the Labor Force is
composed of individuals who have higher returns to schooling, as well as high
returns to work and training (state a). While implementing an IV on the labor
force requires cross sectional selection, it is not the only reason for IV failure.33
There is another explanation. As pointed out earlier, classical IV is not only
dependent on cross sectional sample composition, but also on the time period
at which outcomes are measured. While there exists a single LATE for a given
population (or sub population), there is a multiplicity of IV estimates that may
be associated to the same population. This is due to the extremely high num 
ber of possible individual/age combinations that are possible to construct if the
econometrician uses cross section data (if he/she samples only one wage per in 
dividual). Theoretically, the same group of cross sectional units sampled at two
diﬀerent points in time, would give diﬀerent IV estimates, simply because the cor 
33For instance, as an experiment, we also computed an IV on the general population using
both the control group and the treatment group, using the same time sampling procedure.
Precisely, we used individual wages regardless of work decisions (10,000 observations). The
performance of IV turned out to be as bad as in the Labor force (the four diﬀerent IV estimates
were 0.0353, 0.0789, 0.1205 and 0.1289).
34relation between the instrument and post schooling choices evolves with calendar
time. As most cross section data used to infer wage returns to schooling contain
a relatively balanced age distribution (approximately uniform), it follows that
statistical inference based on this speciﬁc sampling structure may be dependent
on this very speciﬁc pattern.
9 Implementing Alternative Sampling Designs
Given the failure of classical IV applied to the Labor Force, it is natural to
investigate alternative strategies that may help improve IV estimates. Formally,
the issue is to ﬁnd a new sampling procedure that deﬁnes a new composite error
term, say ε∗∗







  (λL(Z) −   λ) (14)
As pointed out earlier, sampling data from a population generated by a dy 
namic structure with unobserved heterogeneity, entails both a cross sectional and
a time dimension. Precisely, the econometrician has to ﬁnd a sampling procedure
that either annihilates ϕit(.), or annihilates its eﬀect on the correlation between
the instrument and the composite error term. Obviously, all of that must occur
without perturbing the distribution of individual speciﬁc returns. This is not
necessarily a simple task. For instance, any cross sectional sampling procedure
that would turn out to reduce ϕit(.) for all individuals in the sample, may also
change the distribution of ωλi Si, if it implies selecting a diﬀerent sub population
(see equation 12). So, reducing ϕit(.) is not necessarily suﬃcient to achieve higher
IV accuracy.
A natural guess is to consider sampling strategies that either restrict the
degree of heterogeneity, or limit the impact of the dynamic eﬀect of schooling.
We now turn our attention to these issues. Precisely, we analyze the impact
35of a Regression Discontinuity design and an age based sampling strategy that
consists of sampling individuals during a speciﬁc time/age interval over the life
cycle.
9.1 A Regression Discontinuity Design
Regression Discontinuity (RD) design has appeared in the recent micro econometric
literature, within the context of static models.34 It is particularly popular in em 
pirical labor economics. Within our framework, one group (the control group)
faces the old policy, while the second group started under the old regime and
experiences the new policy regime at the time when the decision to enter higher
education is made. The idea is to compare the treatment group with the subset
of the control group that is at the margin of entering higher education (grade
level 5) under the old regime.
In the applied literature, the eﬀectiveness of this approach relies on a potential
reduction of the degree of cross sectional heterogeneity. However, in a dynamic
model where returns to schooling are individual speciﬁc, it is far from guaranteed
that a RD design will perform better than classical IV.35
In order to implement this sampling design, we take the labor force population
that was analyzed in the previous section, and select a sub population of indi 
viduals who have completed at least 4 periods of schooling. We then construct a
similar treatment group and simulate their subsequent choices under a new pol 
icy. Obviously, Regression Discontinuity designs always imply (by construction)
34See Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw (2001) for a theoretical presentation and van der
Klauw (2002) for an application.
35In general, the implementation of a speciﬁc RD design within a particular data generating
process, could create a serious divergence between the population LATE parameter, and the
LATE parameter of this hypothetical new population. Furthermore, the results obtained may
be representative of a very limited set of the population. However, and as indicated earlier,
this is not an issue in the present model.
36an important reduction in sample size. In our example, the RD sub population
contains a total of 4000 to 6000 individuals.36
9.1.1 The Dynamic Model
Estimates are reported in Table 5. Interestingly, and as opposed to what was
noted in the Labor Force population, RD design estimates are below the true
population LATE parameters regardless of the power of the instrument. Indeed,
in our speciﬁc example, RD design provides estimates that are closer to the
population average (equal to 0.06). The estimates obtained for the dynamic
model, 0.0551 (low subsidy), and 0.0552 (high subsidy), reveal a surprising degree
of inelasticity of IV with respect to policy intensity.
There is a clear explanation for this. In the low subsidy case (in which the F
statistics is 53.0), the correlation between the instrument and the composite error
term is a small negative number that approaches 0 ( 0.0018), despite a positive
correlation between the instrument and the product of schooling times individual
deviations from the population returns (0.0073), as well as a positive correlation
between the instrument and post schooling choices (0.0073). As a result, because
the instrument appears to be nearly orthogonal with the error term, IV does not
even capture the minimal degree of non orthogonality that is present in standard
static random coeﬃcient models, and approaches the population average. This
gives the illusion that the LATE is equal to the population average, but again,
it is explained by mis speciﬁcation of IV. The same phenomenon occurs with the
stronger policy intensity.
When compared to the standard labor force participants, the degree of inac 
curacy is lower, but remains relatively high, as IV LATE diﬀerences are equal to
36While this particular design implies a more signiﬁcant change in population composition
(a larger fraction of individuals with academic abilities), as is obvious upon examining Table
7, its eﬀect on the true LATE parameter (just like what was observed for the labor force) was
found to be quite small.
37 0.0159 (low subsidy), and to  0.0162 (high subsidy). So, the RD design is not
suﬃcient to eliminate the inaccuracies found with the workforce population. As
with classical IV applied to the labor force population, a huge increase in the
instrument schooling correlation (or a huge increase in ﬁrst stage F statistic) has
no impact on accuracy. Therefore, and has noted earlier in other circumstances,
increasing the power of the instrument does not necessarily imply a reduction in
the IV LATE diﬀerence.
9.1.2 The Static Model
Similar results are found in the static version of the model. As it was the case for
the dynamic model, IV underestimates the LATE. The IV LATE diﬀerences are
equal  0.0224 (low subsidy), and  0.0178 (high subsidy) and are even closer to the
population average. For this sub population, the correlation between the instru 
ment and post schooling choices becomes negative ( 0.004 in both cases). This
negative correlation annihilates the positive correlation between the instrument
and the product of schooling times individual deviations from the population re 
turns. Again, the instrument appear to be nearly orthogonal with the composite
error term.
To summarize, there is no clear evidence that a Regression Discontinuity
design does better than standard IV. Still, it is important to notice that IV
estimates are very sensitive to the use of a Regression Discontinuity design.
9.2 An Age-Based Sampling Design
An aged based design originates from the intuitive conjecture that, in the case
where the mis speciﬁcation of IV depends heavily on post schooling choices, IV
performed on early wages (when ϕit(.) approaches 0 for all individuals) may be
less aﬀected by the dynamic structure of the model than more standard IV applied
to life cycle wages. One way to annihilate ϕit(.) completely would be to sample
38only entry wages. However, such an empirical strategy would require to discard
a large proportion of most standard cross section data sets. Indeed, we do not
know of any cross sectional study that does so. Consequently, we impose an age
limit so that the period elapsed between market entrance and actual sampling is
smaller than in the Labor Force sampling strategy. This approach is feasible for
any applied econometricians who have access to a relatively large cross section.
To implement this, we start from the original Labor Force population. We
compress the age distribution of the potential sampling period, and select indi 
viduals only between period 5 and period 19 (as opposed to period 5 to period
33).
Because sampling early career wages still requires some selection based on
contemporaneous decisions, it is impossible to say if the early career design will
lead to higher IV accuracy. For instance, over sampling early wages implies a
larger dependence on schooling decision outcomes, since a larger portion of wages
will now be measured between period 5 and period 10. In other words, while early
wages may be purged (to some extent) of the contamination introduced by post 
schooling choices, they may be more sensitive to individual decisions to enrol in
higher education.
Because we still select wages of those who work, the results (displayed in Table
6) are naturally comparable with those of Table 4.
9.2.1 The Dynamic Model
We ﬁrst examine the dynamic version of the model. There is clear evidence
that the performance of IV, applied to a sampling design that targets individuals
when they are younger, is superior to the one observed for the broader sampling
window (period 5 period 33). The high and low intensity estimates (0.0727 and
0.0685) are within very small distance of their estimand (0.0710 and 0.0714). The
IV LATE diﬀerences (0.0017 and  0.0029) display the best performance that we
39have encountered so far.
However, and as this was the case earlier, there is no gain imputable to a
statistically stronger instrument. Despite a correlation between the instrument
and schooling that is multiplied by 3, and a F Statistic multiplied by 6, the high
intensity IV does not perform better. Precisely, the IV LATE distance, equals to
0.0017 with the weaker instrument, is larger in absolute value (0.0029) with the
stronger policy.
9.2.2 The Static Model
To say the least, the very good performance of IV within the early career wage
sampling design (in the dynamic model) does not carry to the static version of the
model. IV estimates obtained for the static version of the model (equal to 0.1297
and 0.1212) lie outside the support of the distribution of returns to schooling.
The distance between IV and the relevant LATE parameters ranges from 4 to 5
percentage points. This is one of the worst performances that we have observed
in our analysis. This may easily be explained. Because individuals obtain less
schooling in the static version, the early career sampling procedure will generally
select a diﬀerent population within the static model. For instance, a portion of
individuals who would be in school in period 5 (when sampling starts) in the
dynamic model, are now likely to be selected in the static version of the model.
So, in the static case, the early career sampling procedure is detrimental to IV
accuracy.
To summarize, while the early career sampling design performs well in the
dynamic model, it cannot be regarded as a general solution to IV estimation of
the return to schooling. The gain obtained from narrowing the sampling window
dominates the loss imputable to cross sectional selection, within the dynamic
version of the model, but not in the static version
4010 What does IV Estimate?
Given that IV fails to recover the population LATE parameter, and that we
have not found any alternative sampling design that can guarantee IV accu 
racy, it is natural to investigate what treatment eﬀect can IV estimate. Because
it disregards post schooling choices, it is possible that IV only estimates some
reduced form marginal eﬀect of schooling on wages. Such a quantity may cap 
ture indirect eﬀects of schooling on wages, through the incidence of training and
work experience.
As empirical labor economists often use the term “causal” parameter when
referring to those parameters that are associated to a subset of the population
aﬀected by some experiment, a natural candidate would be the average wage
gain for those who have increased their level of schooling following the higher




Because we have two diﬀerent policy intensities, we computed two diﬀerent
estimates for each model. As the marginal eﬀect is age/time dependent (as is IV),
we used the same sampling method used throughout the analysis, and considered
only one wage per individual (between period 5 and period 33). The marginal
eﬀects are computed using simple OLS regressions. These numbers are reported
in the summary table (Table 8).
As intuition would suggest, the marginal eﬀects of schooling on wages exceed
the population LATE parameters. For the dynamic model, the marginal eﬀects
are equal to 0.1797 and 0.1617. For the static model, the marginal eﬀects are equal
to 0.1780 and 0.1110. In all cases, the marginal eﬀects exceed the corresponding
37The notion of causality used by many empirical labor economists is diﬀerent than the usual
deﬁnition used by economists (namely a parameter that captures the eﬀect of a counterfacatual
change in one variable, holding other variables ﬁxed).
41IV estimates.38
At this stage, the relevant question is whether or not IV estimates tend to be
closer to these marginal aﬀects, than they are to the LATE parameters. Without
loss of generality, we focus our attention on the IV estimates obtained from the
labor force. The answer is obvious. A quick examination of Table 8 reveals
clearly that IV estimates are not closer to the reduced form marginal eﬀects of
those aﬀected (equation 15) than they are to the relevant LATE parameters.
This raises an interesting question. While (15) is deﬁned for the sub population
aﬀected by the experiment, its unconditional version is worth examined. Indeed,
OLS estimates of the eﬀect of education on wages found in columns 1 and 4 of
Table 2, or those reported for all diﬀerent sampling designs (found in Table 8) are
most likely good estimates of this reduced form eﬀect. To avoid confusion with
the marginal eﬀects of schooling that depend on individual reactions to policy
changes, we refer to marginal eﬀects computed from simple OLS (and regardless
of counterfactual outcomes) as “unconditional marginal eﬀects”. As noted earlier,
and aside from those computed for the very speciﬁc RD design sub population,
these OLS estimates gravitate around 0.10, depending on the sub population con 
sidered. They range between 0.08 (for the early career sampling ), and 0.12 (for
the control group).
The interesting issue is now to determine if IV estimates are closer to the
conditional or the unconditional marginal eﬀects. The answer is also clear. In
general, IV estimates are much closer to unconditional OLS estimates of the eﬀect
of education, than their conditional counterparts. This is the case for both IV
estimates obtained in the dynamic model, and for the low intensity IV estimate
associated to the static model. For the high intensity policy applied to the static
38Indeed, these marginal eﬀects could also have been computed from each sub-population
(the control group, the general labor force, or the RD design group). As the results are quite
similar, and for the sake of clarity, we use only the population marginal eﬀects as potential
estimand in order to illustrate our points.
42model, IV is closer to the conditional marginal aﬀect than the unconditional, but,
it is still far from both. Indeed, as we had noticed earlier, the high intensity/static
model was virtually the only case where IV approached the population LATE.
Interestingly, these results carry to both the RD design and the early career
sampling strategies. Indeed, because IV estimates obtained from the Regression
Discontinuity design are always below the population LATE parameter, the dif 
ference between IV estimates and the marginal eﬀects of schooling (either the
conditional or the unconditional one) are even larger.
To conclude, given the failure of IV to recover the population LATE parame 
ter, there is no evidence that IV is even capable of estimating any reduced form
marginal eﬀect of schooling on wages for those aﬀected by the policy experiment.
Within a dynamic setting, IV therefore appears to be deprived of any “causal”
substance.
11 Concluding Remarks
In many ﬁelds of economics (especially in Labor Economics), it is common to
estimate an outcome equation under the maintained hypothesis that outcomes
measured over the life cycle are aﬀected by a single endogenous (choice) vari 
able. In such a case, and under certain conditions, IV may converge to some
interpretable parameter. This is exempliﬁed in the empirical literature devoted
to the estimation of returns to schooling, in which inference is typically based
on a single instrument, and in which high IV estimates are said to arise because
they reﬂect the LATE parameters of a subpopulation of individuals aﬀected by
liquidity constraints, or of a subpopulation of individuals who have high discount
rates.
This line of reasoning is made of two diﬀerent conjectures. One is about
the link between the underlying heterogeneity structure and individual choices.
Precisely, it says that those aﬀected by the experiment have high returns to
43schooling, but would have not reached higher education in absence of policy
exposure, because they may be endowed with high discount rates (or face liquidity
constraints). The second one is about the capacity of IV to recover the LATE
parameter.
The analysis presented in this paper has illustrated that, within a dynamic
setting, the second argument may be particularly wrong. As seen earlier, our
model implies a LATE parameter that exceeds the population average, for exactly
these same reasons.39 Yet, IV estimates are, in some cases, much larger than the
relevant treatment eﬀect parameter, and in other cases (like in the RD design),
much smaller.
In a dynamic setting, IV seems to estimate neither the population LATE
parameter, nor any reduced form “causal” eﬀect of schooling on wages. Unless the
econometrician is capable of ﬁnding a sampling design that annihilates the eﬀect
of post schooling dynamics (so to recover the basic properties of a static correlated
random coeﬃcient wage regression model in which the correlation between the
instrument and the error term is solely explained by the correlation between
schooling and individual returns), he/she must implicitly make at least one of the
following assumptions; a precise correlation structure characterizing unobserved
heterogeneity, very speciﬁc distributions of random shocks, a highly restrictive
law of motion, or particular preferences. Without any implicit “functional form
restrictions”, equation (14) is not veriﬁed, and IV is deprived of any “causal”
substance. Access to a “strong” instrument is not a solution.
The analysis presented in the paper was conﬁned to one speciﬁc parameter;
namely the return to schooling. It need not be the case. We believe that our
conclusions could be transported to a wide class of parameters that economists
typically estimate using life cycle data on choices and outcomes. The economic
39It is generally impossible to say if the ﬁrst conjecture is correct. We performed our analysis
within a theoretical framework where the LATE exceeds the population average. Obviously, it
would be possible to construct a model structure where the opposite would prevail.
44returns to work experience, or to on the job training, the eﬀect of work interrup 
tions on female wages, the impact of unemployment duration or unemployment
incidence on post unemployment opportunities, the eﬀect of job displacement on
earnings, or the eﬀect of child birth on female labor market outcomes, are all ex 
amples of parameters that applied econometricians may be tempted to estimate
by IV. Because all of these parameters could easily be interpreted within a truly
dynamic theoretical structure, we conjecture that classical IV could suﬀer the
same problems that have been encountered in the present paper.
Obviously, it is the econometrician’s prerogative to assume a particular data
generating process, or to prefer a static representation of the labor market over
a dynamic one. After all, with life cycle data on choices and outcomes, it is not
possible to establish whether or not the data generating process is dynamic or sta 
tic. This is particularly true because identifying the present component from the
future component of an intertemporal utility function is diﬃcult, and because the
exact structure of the law of motion is diﬃcult to establish if the dynamics of the
underlying model is explained by multi dimensional unobserved state variables
(or parameters). Every estimation method must rely on fundamentally subjec 
tive assumptions. So, every micro econometric model is mis speciﬁed, and the
choice between IV and structural methods is also subjective. This is a triviality.
However, interpreting IV estimates of an outcome equation outside of the “one
endogenous variable/one instrument” paradigm, is not an innocuous task. This
cannot be debated.
45Table 1A
Life Cycle Choices in the Dynamic Model
Average Number of Periods Accumulated in each State, by Date.
state (s) state (e) state (a) state (h)
Date School Work Work/Training Home
1 0.824 0.068 0.000 0.108
2 1.568 0.190 0.000 0.242
3 2.272 0.353 0.000 0.375
4 2.956 0.528 0.000 0.516
5 3.474 0.786 0.087 0.653
6 3.936 1.085 0.189 0.790
7 4.351 1.392 0.335 0.922
8 4.727 1.712 0.505 1.056
9 4.891 2.047 0.877 1.185
10 4.988 2.417 1.276 1.319
15 5.045 4.451 3.545 1.959
20 5.045 7.358 4.981 2.616
25 5.045 11.442 5.223 3.290
30 5.045 15.736 5.259 3.960
33 5.045 18.333 5.259 4.363
46Table 1B
Life Cycle choices in the Static model
Average Number of Periods Accumulated in each State, by Date.
state (s) state (e) state (a) state (h)
Date School Work Work/Training Home
1 0.639 0.115 0.014 0.232
2 1.186 0.307 0.015 0.492
3 1.720 0.511 0.015 0.754
4 2.247 0.713 0.017 1.023
5 2.631 0.954 0.122 1.293
6 2.949 1.229 0.254 1.568
7 3.240 1.499 0.432 1.829
8 3.503 1.800 0.605 2.092
9 3.652 2.094 0.893 2.361
10 3.750 2.409 1.218 2.623
15 3.815 4.094 3.168 4.632
20 3.815 6.491 4.455 6.250
25 3.815 9.890 4.707 6.588
30 3.815 12.766 4.780 7.639
33 3.815 15.699 4.781 8.705
47Table 2A
Summary Statistics of Life Cycle Wages
Dynamic Model Static Model
Date Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev.
1 5.60 2.95 5.56 2.89
2 5.92 3.25 5.93 3.17
3 6.29 3.39 6.26 3.35
4 6.62 3.65 6.54 3.51
5 6.97 3.95 6.91 3.91
6 7.34 4.10 7.14 4.04
7 7.80 4.52 7.62 4.55
8 8.24 5.17 8.04 4.91
9 8.67 5.51 8.36 5.44
10 9.05 5.85 8.70 5.77
15 11.26 8.27 10.66 8.28
20 13.12 11.02 12.43 10.59
25 13.62 10.89 13.29 11.65
30 14.55 12.06 13.88 11.95
33 15.23 12.80 14.53 12.63
48Table 2B
OLS regressions on Simulated Wages
Dynamic Model Static Model
estimate estimate
(t ratio) (t ratio)
education 0.1220 0.1328 0.1332 0.1206 0.1316 0.1334
(51.9) (20.10) (22.11) (53.6) (21.0) (20.18)
experience 0.0123 0.1090 0.0153 0.0934
(4.23) (3.55) (4.18) (3.08)
experience2    0.0057  0.0046
(3.18) (2.66)
# of individuals 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000
R2 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.25 0.27 0.33
Note: The regressions are computed on a cross section of wages generated
from simulated choices in the control group. The cross section contains 5,000
observations (20 types multiplied by 250 diﬀerent realizations of the full vector
of random shocks).
49Table 3
The eﬀects of a Higher Education Subsidy in the Population:
Local Average Treatment Eﬀects of Education and Instrument
Power
Level of Subsidy Low High
Dynamic Model
∆Schooling 0.25 0.54
LATE (λL) 0.0710 0.0714
Proportion aﬀected 0.175 0.315
F Stat 12.3 57.9
Static Model
∆Schooling 0.13 0.50
LATE (λL) 0.0789 0.0781
Proportion. aﬀected 0.093 0.258
F Stat 3.3 45.4
Note: The higher education subsidy is 1$ in the low subsidy experiment, and
3$ in the high subsidy experiment. ∆Schooling is the diﬀerence between the
average years of schooling in the treatment group and the control group. The
LATE is deﬁned as E(λ | Si(Zlow)  = Si(Zhigh)) and the proportion aﬀected is the
fraction of the population for whom ∆Schoolingi  = 0. The F statistic is computed
from an OLS regression of schooling on the policy shock exposure indicator.
50Table 4
Classical IV in the Labor Force
Model Dynamic Static
Level of the Subsidy Low High Low High
ˆ λiV 0.1000 0.1026 0.0292 0.0858
st error of ˆ λIV 0.0374 0.0190 0.0260 0.0170
ˆ λOLS 0.0917 0.0905 0.0921 0.0908
ˆ λiV − λL 0.0288 0.0312  0.0497 0.0077
ˆ λiV −   λ 0.0398 0.0426  0.0308 0.0258
Corr(Zi, ε∗
it) 0.0119 0.0240  0.0015 0.0168
Corr(Zi, ϕit(.)) 0.0074 0.0099  0.0062 0.0050
Corr(Zi,ωλi   Si) 0.0097 0.0104 0.0010 0.0236
Corr(Zi, S) 0.0481 0.0905 0.0067 0.0882
F Stat 17.9 63.9 0.3 54.7
# of individuals 7717 7738 7031 6981
51Table 5
Alternative Sampling Designs:
Regression Discontinuity at Grade Level 5
Model Dynamic Static
Level of the Subsidy Low High Low High
ˆ λiV 0.0551 0.0552 0.0565 0.0603
st error of ˆ λiV 0.0367 0.0171 0.0600 0.0162
ˆ λOLS 0.1331 0.1419 0.1398 0.1358
ˆ λIV − λL  0.0159  0.0162  0.0224  0.0178
ˆ λIV −   λ  0.0049  0.0048  0.0035 0.0003
Corr(Zi, ε∗
it)  0.0018  0.0038  0.0009 0.0003
Corr(Zi, ϕit(.)) 0.0064 0.0149  0.0037  0.0037
Corr(Zi,ωλi   Si) 0.0073 0.0181 0.0097 0.0351
Corr(Zi, S) 0.0959 0.2148 0.0588 0.2240
F Stat 53.0 278.4 15.3 227.6
# of individuals 5708 5758 4004 4310
52Table 6
Alternative Sampling Design:
Early Career Sampling (period 5—period 19)
Model Dynamic Static
Level of Subsidy low High low High
ˆ λiV 0.0727 0.0685 0.1297 0.1212
st error of ˆ λiV 0.0530 0.0215 0.0707 0.0245
ˆ λOLS 0.0801 0.0800 0.0871 0.0863
ˆ λIV − λL 0.0017  0.0029 0.0508 0.0431
ˆ λIV −   λ 0.0127 0.0085 0.0697 0.0612
Corr(Zi, ε∗
it) 0.0029 0.0047 0.0127 0.0320
Corr(Zi, ϕit(.))  0.0104 0.0080  0.0022  0.0018
Corr(Zi,ωλi   Si) 0.0031 0.0127 0.0117 0.0210
Corr(Zi, S) 0.0351 0.0854 0.0247 0.0685
F stat 8.5 50.5 3.9 29.7
# of individuals 6887 6871 6430 6292
53Table 7
The Heterogeneity Distribution in Various Sub-Populations
αS αH λ θ δ ca
0 β
General 0.5000 2.8000 0.0600 0.0100 0.0300 5.1300 0.9485
Population
(control group)
Labor 0.5751 2.8003 0.0637 0.0121 0.0318 5.0895 0.9495
Force
(Table 4)




A Summary of Results
Population parameters, IV, and OLS
Model Dynamic Static
Level of the Subsidy Low High Low High
LATE (λL) 0.0710 0.0714 0.0789 0.0781
Pop Average (  λ) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
[λmin,λmax] [0.01,0.12] [0.01,0.12] [0.01,0.12] [0.01,0.12]
δE(wit)
δSi |Si(Zhigh) =Si(Zlow) 0.1797 0.1617 0.1780 0.1110
IV (Work Force) 0.1000 0.1026 0.0292 0.0858
IV (RD Design) 0.0551 0.0552 0.0565 0.0603
IV (early career) 0.0727 0.0685 0.1297 0.1212
OLS (Work Force) 0.0917 0.0905 0.0921 0.0908
OLS (RD Design) 0.1331 0.1419 0.1398 0.1358
IV (early career) 0.0801 0.0800 0.0871 0.0863
OLS (control group) 0.1220 0.1206
55Appendix: Table A1 - The Heterogeneity Distribution
type αS αH λ θ δ ca
0 β
1  0.1575 2.59 0.010 0.0000 0.0050 5.4851 0.97
2 0.0425 3.01 0.029 0.0246 0.0145 5.3771 0.99
3 0.6425 2.56 0.081 0.0000 0.0405 5.0531 0.91
4 0.4425 2.66 0.051 0.0066 0.0255 5.1611 0.97
5  0.2575 2.81 0.027 0.000 0.0135 5.5391 0.95
6 0.3425 2.71 0.039 0.0366 0.0195 5.2150 0.92
7  0.0575 2.91 0.033 0.0126 0.0165 5.4310 0.90
8  0.1575 2.85 0.025 0.0056 0.0125 5.4851 0.96
9 0.1425 2.87 0.045 0.0306 0.0225 5.3231 0.93
10 1.1925 2.76 0.057 0.0186 0.0285 4.7561 0.98
11  0.3575 2.91 0.020 0.0000 0.0100 5.5931 0.91
12 0.3425 3.01 0.043 0.0016 0.0215 5.2150 0.99
13 0.2425 2.61 0.075 0.0196 0.0375 5.2691 0.96
14 0.2425 2.61 0.069 0.0136 0.0345 5.2691 0.99
15 0.9425 2.85 0.087 0.0166 0.0435 4.8910 0.95
16 0.7425 2.87 0.093 0.0076 0.0465 4.9991 0.94
17 1.5425 2.81 0.079 0.0006 0.0395 4.5671 0.90
18 1.7425 2.76 0.118 0.0076 0.0590 4.4591 0.92
19 1.2425 2.63 0.112 0.0136 0.0560 4.7291 0.98
20 1.1425 3.21 0.107 0.0106 0.0535 4.7831 0.95
Mean 0.50 2.80 0.06 0.01 0.03 5.13 0.95
St Dev. 0.62 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.34 0.03
Note: Each type has a population proportion equal to 0.05.
56Table A2
The correlation between the heterogeneity components
cost of value of return to return to return to cost of discount
school home time education experience training training factor
αS αH λ θ δ ca
0 β
αS 1.00  0.009 0.857 0.111 0.857  1.00  0.106
αH 1.00  0.043 0.087  0.043 0.009  0.046
β 1.00 0.110 1.00  0.857  0.076
θ 1.00 0.110  0.111 0.112
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